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Abstract 
This paper investigates the effect of zero and negative interest rate policy of Japan on the 
inflation rate and the role of exchange rate in conducting the zero and negative interest rate 
policy. The disappointing economic performance thus seems primarily due to a series of adverse 
economic shocks rather than an extraordinary policy error. The empirical analysis is based on, 
primarily, a stylized VAR model of the Japanese economy with the innovation that the interest 
rate policy, and the exchange rate—two important parameters for assessing the stance of 
monetary policy—are allowed to vary over time. Secondly, the estimated VAR model 
investigates whether alternative interest-rate policy approaches proposed in the literature could 
have improved macroeconomic performance. Though, Granger causality method has been used 
in the earlier literature to measure the causation of interest rate on inflation rate and it also used 
to see the block and instantaneous causality between the systems of variables. Next, using an 
estimated structural model, I identified a number of adverse shocks occurring after the 1990s. It 
thus follows that int. rate policy was not solely responsible for the stimulation neither in inflation 
growth performance nor in increasing the output growth.  Aiming for a low inflation level and 
responding to the economy according to a conventional policy rule provided insufficient 
insurance against the contractionary shocks that occurred over the 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Japan has achieved the high economic growth in the 1980s. By the middle of the 1980s, stock 
and land prices have grown sharply. The exchange rate of Japan has appreciated greatly since 
1985; although, exports did not decline. Whereas, at the end of the 1980s the Japanese economy 
experienced severe conditions after the so-called bubble economy burst. The country had gone 
through a serious recession with very low growth rates from 1990-2000 and the main reason for 
the recession was primarily country’s fragile financial system such as delays in reforms or 
deregulation in many areas. Particularly, increased nonperforming loan problems caused the 
Japanese financial institutions to reduce their level of funds for investing and it damaged the 
Japanese economy.  
Since the latter half of the 1990s, Japan's economy has been in a state of low inflation rate, in 
which the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index was either zero or slightly 
negative. A distinctive feature of Japan's deflation is that it was moderate but persistent. The 
recovery has reported but only for short period of time in some period. The annual average rate 
of decline in the CPI from fiscal 1998 to fiscal 2012 was a close to minus 0.3 percent, but this 
decline went on for 15 years. However, major macro incident brought down the inflation and 
economic growth of the Japan, First, following the burst of the asset bubble at the beginning of 
the 1990s, firms and financial institutions were forced to repair their impaired balance sheets. 
The Bank of Japan successively lowered the policy interest rate. The policy rate, which had 
stood at 6 percent in August 1990, was reduced to the then globally unprecedented level of 0.25 
percent in September 1998. As a result, conventional monetary policy tools had been almost 
exhausted by around 1997-98 when anxiety about the financial system due to the financial crisis 
reached its peak. As a result of the erosion of banks' intermediation function, Japan's economy 
fell into a situation in which the effects of monetary policy did not sufficiently feed through to 
the economy. 
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The Bank of Japan's Unconventional Monetary Policies 
The expressions such as "zero interest rate policy," "quantitative easing," "credit easing," and 
"forward guidance”, These are names of unconventional monetary policy measures introduced 
by central banks in the United States and Europe after the global financial crisis. In fact, most of 
these policy measures were originally implemented in one form or another by the Bank of Japan 
ahead of other central banks in response to the 15 years of deflation since the latter half of the 
1990s. 
The Bank of Japan had lowered the policy rate to 0.25 percent in September 1998, reaching a 
situation in which the conventional monetary policy tool of setting the policy interest rate had 
been almost exhausted. Japan's economy was facing the "zero lower bound on nominal interest 
rates." However, economic activity and prices did not improve.  
Further, Japan's inflation rates continued to slide, despite the various unconventional monetary 
policies pursued by the Bank. In that sense, the Bank's past policies were not sufficient to lift 
Japan's economy out of deflation. 
There were certain leakages which hindered the inflation to pull out its growth; the first was the 
lack of a strong enough commitment to price stability. The second was element that had been 
lacking is policies that have a sufficiently large impact, whereas policies need to have a large 
impact. Nevertheless, the impact provided by those policies proved insufficient to allow the 
economy to escape from its deflationary equilibrium. 
Introduction of Zero interest rate policy 
In February 2, 1999, the BOJ adopted the zero interest rate policy which was prodigious all over 
the world in order to combat deflationary pressure and to boost the economy. Furthermore, the 
bank of Japan had again announced in April 1999 that it would continue the zero interest rate 
policy until deflationary concerns were removed. After that, as the economic situation displayed 
signs of gradual recovery, the zero interest rate policy was cancelled on August 11, 2000. It 
considers potential differences between interest rate cuts in positive versus negative territory on 
deposit and lending rates, as well as banks interest rate margins and profitability, and market 
functioning. When rates approach the point at which most agents switch into cash, further cuts 
will become ineffective or counterproductive if they hinder financial intermediation and 
Pressures could then grow on banks’ business models, profits and charter values, with negative 
consequences for financial stability. 
Major central banks cut their policy rates to zero or slightly above the zero during the global 
financial crisis. As zero was then considered the lower bound for policy rates, further monetary 
easing was achieved through unconventional measures-such as forward guidance, asset purchase 
programs, and credit easing-to stimulate growth and stabilize inflation expectations. These 
policies led to a substantial decline in nominal and real interest rates, and helped support a slow 
and uneven recovery in economic activity. 
 
Introduction of QQE 
QQE has the following two features. One feature is a strong and clear commitment to achieve 
price stability. The other feature is large-scale monetary accommodation to underpin the 
commitment. QQE with a Negative Interest Rate was an extension of the existing policy 
framework of QQE. 
In April 2013, the Bank of Japan introduced an inflation target of 2% with the aim of 
overcoming deflation and achieving sustainable economic growth. But due to lower international 
oil prices, it was unable to achieve this target and was forced to take further measures. Hence, in 
February 2016, the Bank of Japan adopted a negative interest rate policy by massively increasing 
the money supply through purchasing long-term Japanese government bonds. The Bank of Japan 
had previously purchased short-term government bonds mainly, a policy that flattened the yield 
curve of Japanese govt. bonds. On the one hand, banks reduced the numbers of government 
bonds because short-term bond yields had become negative and even the interest rates of long 
term government bonds up to 15 years became negative. Even though, bank loans to the 
corporate sector did not increase due to the Japanese economy’s vertical investment-saving.  
The interest rate channel through exchange rate has helped many countries to achieve their 
objective; exchange rate aided the monetary mechanism with the negative interest rate policy. 
For instance, In Switzerland, the monetary authority adopted a negative interest rate policy to 
ease excessive appreciation pressure on its domestic currency, but the currency appreciated as 
the authority cut the interest rate further into negative territory. On the other hand, Sweden and 
countries in the euro area experienced depreciation in their currencies as a result of the adoption 
of negative interest rate policies. In Denmark, its currency is pegged to the euro, and the 
monetary authority employed the negative interest rate policy as one of the options for changing. 
Decline in Crude Oil Prices Has Been Weighing on Price Increases Exports and production are 
sluggish at present. However, as the Bank has strengthened QQE, Indeed, prices do not appear 
to be rising, as the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI -- the price index that the Bank adopts 
as its price target for the time being -- was only 0 percent for all items less fresh food in 
February 2016. However, this was caused by a decline in energy prices due to the fall in crude 
oil prices worldwide, and prices in terms of the CPI for all items less fresh food and energy show 
a steady increase of 1.1 percent for February 2016. As energy prices will not continue falling 
forever, the CPI including energy -- that is, CPI for all items less fresh food -- will also start to 
rise as the effects of the fall in energy prices dissipate. Prices have not risen as much as initially 
had been expected, but this is due to the fall in crude oil prices. As these prices stabilize, prices 
will rise. However, I think that QQE would be a serious failure if prices rose without 
employment growth. Prices eventually will start rising as the output gap in the overall economy 
tightens and the unemployment rate declines. 
 
 Why Has the Price Stability Target Not Yet Been Achieved?  
In order to see the underlying trend in consumer prices, it is necessary to look at the rate of 
change in the CPI excluding fresh food and energy, since the CPI excluding fresh food but 
including energy is affected by temporary fluctuations in oil prices. The important thing to note 
when looking at these indexes is that their underlying trend was negative from the mid-1990s 
onward, but following the introduction of QQE the rate of change in the CPI excluding fresh 
food and energy turned positive and since then has continued to be on an uptrend. Immediately 
after the introduction of QQE in April 2013, the rate of change in the CPI excluding fresh food 
and energy increased from around minus 0.5 percent to around plus 1 percent. After losing 
momentum in the start of the consumption tax hike in April 2014, the rate of change moved 
upward again with the expansion of QQE, but then again started to decline in 2016. Certainly, 
the 2 percent price stability target has not yet been achieved.  
 
Analyses by the Bank suggest that a major causes for the situation is the decline in inflation 
expectations, and that the following two factors responsible for the decline in inflation 
expectations. First, (1) the decline in crude oil prices, (2) the weakness in demand following the 
consumption tax hike in April 2014, and (3) the slowdown in emerging economies and volatile 
global financial markets, have lowered the inflation rate. Although in 2018, Long-term interest 
rates have risen, mainly reflecting concern over an expected increase in the issuance of U.S. 
Treasuries under the country's expansionary fiscal policy, and higher inflation expectations due 
to rises in crude oil prices and hence inflation rate. Even in February 2018, when the volatility of 
stock prices increased, the volatility of U.S. Treasury futures remained stable at a low level. 
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Literature Review 
The zero interest rate policy was first introduced in Japan. Since then, Japanese monetary policy 
has received much attention from the world. However, only a few studies have examined the 
effects of this policy empirically. The relationship of recent Japanese monetary policy to the 
monetary base rule should be examined much more in detail so that policy implication should 
reflects in other macro variables also.  
Judd and Motley (1992, 1993) presented a feedback rule in which central banks change the 
interest rate in response to divergence between actual and targeted nominal GDP growth rate. 
Kurihara (2010) examined the effectiveness of Bank of Japan intraday financial policies. Ueda 
(2011) examined the nontraditional monetary policy adopted by the Bank of Japan 1998-2006.  
Fukuda (2011) showed that zero interest rate policy by the bank of Japan caused the short term 
interest rate to fall to zero and was somewhat effective at reducing the size of the spread in the 
call market.  
Hanabusa (2010) showed that the zero interest rate policy stabilized the long-term interest rates 
in Japan. 
 Kurihara (2012) used daily data to examine the impact of bank of Japan news announcements on 
interest rates.  
Honda, Kuroki, and Tachibana (2013) and Kurihara (2013) examined recent Japanese monetary 
policy.  
Schenelberg and Watzka (2013) showed that Japanese quantitative easing shock leads to a 
significant decrease in long-term interest rates and increases output and the price level; however, 
the effects were only transitory.  
S. Pelin Berkmen (2012) uses the structural VAR model to analyze the effect of Bank of Japan’s 
Quantitative and Credit Easing. 
 
Data and Methodology  
In this paper I’ve analyzed the effectiveness of zero and negative int. rate policy of Japan. Policy 
in an economy with zero & negative nominal interest rates as experienced in Japan since the 
mid-1990s. In this paper, I attempted to provide a quantitative evaluation of the importance of 
the zero interest rate bound and the likelihood of a liquidity trap in Japan. This paper explores the 
implications of interest rate policies for monetary policy transmission and effect on inflation. 
This paper extends the analysis basic VAR by explicitly using the BOJ’s monetary easing 
measures in quantity terms. The regressions trace the impact of interest rate policy measures on 
inflation activity directly, and therefore, shocks to spreads are not interpreted as monetary policy 
actions. This paper relies on following sets of variables: 
Crude oil prices  
Exchange rate 
Long run interest rate 
Short run interest rate 
CPI- all items 
Share price index 
The VAR regressions are done for the period of 1985-07-01 to 2017-10-30, which covers three 
distinct episodes of BOJ’s monetary policy: i) the zero interest rate policy from 1999 to 2000 and 
the quantitative easing period between 2001 and 2006; ii) Post-Lehman policy measures, 
including JGB and CP purchases and fund supplying operations; and iii) the CME, starting in 
2010. While policy instruments differ in each period, they all affect the current account balance 
at the BOJ through changes in liquidity.  
To study the effectiveness of Interest rates, I employed the VAR model. To analyzed the effect 
of the shock of short and long run interest rate on inflation and other variable by using 
orthogonalised impulse response, forecast error variance decomposition and generalized impulse 
response. The model is essential for the analysis of effectiveness of interest rate and how the 
change in int. rate affects the inflation rate and other macro components. I tried to finds some 
evidence that Bank of Japan’s Int. rate policy during 1990-2018 have had an impact on economic 
activity as well as on inflation. However, Impulse response assumes shock occur only once in 
variable at a time. On the other hand, correlation of the error term may indicate that the shock in 
one variable is likely to be accompanied by a shock from other variable. Hence, there will be 
some shocks which may have occurred more than once; therefore a better alternative is to use 
“Orthogonalized Impulse Response”. Alternative method that provides the another information 
about the dynamic linkages between the inflation and interest rate are granger causality and 
instantaneous causality, however both underpin the causality between the variables 
Granger causality shows whether a scalar variable “y” can help forecast another scalar variable 
“x”. If it is not does, then we say “y” does not granger “x” 
The major difference between orthogonalized and generalized impulse response is that, both 
differ in terms of ordering of varaibles, orthogonalised impulse decomospotistion is sensitive to 
ordering of the variable while generalized impulse response is not. The forecast error variance 
decomposition gives us extra information about the VAR matrix. 
   
    VAR (2)  
                    Model 1:  𝑌𝑡 = Ф1𝑌𝑡 +⋯+Ф𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 +𝜔𝑋𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
                    Model 2:  𝑌𝑡 = Ф1𝑌𝑡 +⋯+Ф𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑒𝑡 
                     Where,  𝑌 represents endogenous variable  
                     𝑋 Represent exogenous variable- Crude oil Price 
 
 
The above table shows the unit roost test result and values are significant calculate from p 
values. Before modeling the VAR model, I used the selection criteria which have followed by 
normality test, box-Q test and ARCH effect. Results provide significant outcome that aided to 
model VAR process.  
Consequently, VAR (2) model has provided by AIC criterion. I built two separate models, in 
order to see the oil price interaction on inflation rate, I use crude oil as an exogenous variable in 
first model and later it excluded in model B. 
Since, The R package doesn’t provide generalized impulse response certainly, to compensate this 
result I used Eviews to calculate the generalized impulse response and compare it to 
orthogonalised impulse response. Further, I use the causality test to check the granger and 
instantaneous causality. Result shows that CPI granger cause to other variables in when crude oil 
prices have taken into account but results alter when crude oil excludes from the model. It gave 
us analysis that crude oil has significant impact to inflation rate as well on exchange rate. 
         
Intermediate ADF test results UNTITLED
Series Prob. Lag  Max Lag Obs
CPI 0.0216787... 11 16 371
CRUDE_OIL_P... 9.3331665... 0 16 382
EXCHANGE_RATE 1.8410537... 0 16 382
M3 0.0253189... 3 16 379
LONG_INT__RATE 3.5705101... 5 16 377
SHARE_PRICE 1.1302845... 0 16 382
SHORT_INT__... 1.5320309... 4 16 378
  
 
 
Finally, Impulse responses are calculated from the VAR model representing insignificant values 
of the coefficients of the lags, even, short run and long run interest doesn’t have any impact on 
CPI. Figure below presents the generalized impulse responses, shock of all variables except 
exchange rate and crude oil prices doesn’t have any effect on CPI, even though crude oil price 
and exchange rate have very small effect close to zero. The impact on inflation becomes visible, 
but still not statistically significant in the VAR model. 
Quantitative and monetary easing appear to have no effect on the exchange rate, as we do not 
detect statistically significant systematic impact of the monetary policy variable on the exchange 
rate across the equations. This result is also consistent with recent studies 
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
CPI
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Crude oil price
-30
-20
-10
0
10
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Exchange rate
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Long int. rate
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Share price
-.010
-.005
.000
.005
.010
.015
.020
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
M3
-4
-2
0
2
4
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Short int. rate
 Alternative method, FEVD, which also provides extra information on error structures, shows 
that, factors contributing to forecast CPI are insignificant or close to zero. 
 
Finally I forecasted the CPI for 10 periods ahead to look the, forecast decomposition also 
suggests that inflation rate wouldn’t pull out in foreseeable time. 
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Concluding Remarks 
This article examined the effect of the zero interest rate policy of the BOJ in financial markets 
during the period when the policy was in force. The empirical results show that this policy was 
not effective to influence the inflation rate for long term. The zero interest rate policy has been 
effective in terms of lowering and stabilizing interest rates. The paper finds some evidence that 
recent monetary easing by the BoJ have supported economic activity, although the statistical 
significance varies in different estimates. Using different measures for economic activity, 
ranging from inflation to exchange rate, the VAR regressions pick up some impact on economic 
activity. While the evidence is still weak, these results are still an improvement over earlier 
findings looking at previous QE periods. The results from this paper suggest that the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism may have strengthened, while the impact of quantitative and 
other monetary easing on inflation, however, is weaker. This might reflect Japan’s stable 
inflation expectations and relatively flat Phillips curve, which requires large changes in output to 
move inflation. Similarly, Lam (2011) finds that recent monetary easing measures have had no 
statistically significant impact on inflation expectations the paper did not find evidence that 
BOJ’s monetary policy measures have had an effect on the exchange rate. Therefore, any impact 
on economic activity is likely to work through other channels, which could include portfolio 
rebalancing, commitment effects, expectations, or Reduction in liquidity, risk premium rather 
than the exchange rate channel. Therefore, this paper is a first step in assessing quantitatively the 
effectiveness of policies introduced by bank of japan.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Smitka, M., (2004), “Japan’s Macroeconomic Dilemmas: The Implications of Demographics for 
Growth and Stability”, Washington and Lee University Lexington. 
Yoshino, N., Hesary., and Miyamoto, Hiraoki., (2017), “The Effectiveness of Japan’s Negative 
Interest Rate Policy”, ADBI Working Paper Series, No. 652. 
Okina, K., and Shiratsuka, S., (2003), “Policy commitment and expectation formation: Japan’s 
experience under zero interest rates”, Institute for monetary and economic study, Vol-15, pp. 75-
100. 
Jurkšas, L., (2017), “An Impact Assessment of Negative Interest Rates of Central Banks”, 
EKONOMIKA, Vol-96(1). 
Angrick, S., and Nemoto, N., (2017), “Central Banking below Zero: The Implementation of 
Negative Interest Rates in Europe and Japan”, ADBI Working Paper series, No. 740. 
Bernanke, Ben., (2017), “Some Reflections on Japanese Monetary Policy”, Brookings Institution 
and the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy. 
Berkmen, S. P., (2012), “Bank of Japan’s Quantitative and Credit Easing: Are They Now More 
Effective?”, IMF Working Paper, WP/12/2. 
Baumeister, C., and Benati, L., (2011), “Unconventional Monetary Policy and the Great 
Recession,” ECB Working Paper Series, No. 1258. 
Bernanke, B. S., and Blinder, A. S., (1992), “The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of 
Monetary Transmission”, American Economic Review, Vol-82, pp. 901–921. 
Christiano, L. J., et.al., (2005), “Nominal Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to 
Monetary Policy”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol-113, pp. 1-45. 
Chung, H., et.al., (2011), “Have we Underestimated the Likelihood and Severity of Zero Lower 
Bound Events?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper Series, Vol-113, pp. 1–
45. 
Franta, M., (2011), “Identification of Monetary Policy Shocks in Japan Using Sign Restrictions 
within the TVP-VAR Framework”, The Bank of Japan-Institute for Monetary and Economic 
Studies Discussion Paper Series E-113. 
Liu, P., Mumtaz, H., 2012, “Changing Macroeconomic Dynamics at the Zero Lower Bound”, 
forthcoming Bank of England Working Paper. 
Nakajima, J., (2011), “Monetary Policy Transmission under Zero Interest Rates: An Extended 
Time-Varying Parameter Vector Autoregression Approach”, The Bank of Japan- Institute for 
Monetary and Economic Studies Discussion Paper-No. 2011–E-8. 
Peersman, G., and Smets, F., (2001), “The Monetary Transmission Mechanism in the Euro Area: 
More Evidence from VAR Analysis,” European Central Bank Working Paper No. 91. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Date: 05/16/18   Time: 22:34
Sample: 1985M08 2017M06
Lags: 12
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
 CRUDE_OIL_PRICE does not Granger Cause CPI 371 3.30766... 0.0001...
 CPI does not Granger Cause CRUDE_OIL_PRICE 1.87500... 0.0362...
 EXCHANGE_RATE does not Granger Cause CPI 371 0.45942... 0.9371...
 CPI does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE_RATE 1.17877... 0.2967...
 LONG_INT__RATE does not Granger Cause CPI 371 2.38675... 0.0057...
 CPI does not Granger Cause LONG_INT__RATE 1.19303... 0.2862...
 SHARE_PRICE does not Granger Cause CPI 371 1.14223... 0.3246...
 CPI does not Granger Cause SHARE_PRICE 1.34811... 0.1895...
 M3 does not Granger Cause CPI 371 1.75035... 0.0552...
 CPI does not Granger Cause M3 1.90483... 0.0327...
 SHORT_INT__RATE does not Granger Cause CPI 371 1.14981... 0.3186...
 CPI does not Granger Cause SHORT_INT__RATE 0.92877... 0.5180...
 EXCHANGE_RATE does not Granger Cause CRUDE_OIL_PRICE 371 0.75724... 0.6944...
 CRUDE_OIL_PRICE does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE_RATE 0.68143... 0.7694...
 LONG_INT__RATE does not Granger Cause CRUDE_OIL_PRICE 371 0.12241... 0.9998...
 CRUDE_OIL_PRICE does not Granger Cause LONG_INT__RATE 0.43476... 0.9489...
 SHARE_PRICE does not Granger Cause CRUDE_OIL_PRICE 371 0.96880... 0.4784...
 CRUDE_OIL_PRICE does not Granger Cause SHARE_PRICE 0.49921... 0.9148...
 M3 does not Granger Cause CRUDE_OIL_PRICE 371 0.96927... 0.4779...
 CRUDE_OIL_PRICE does not Granger Cause M3 0.46003... 0.9368...
 SHORT_INT__RATE does not Granger Cause CRUDE_OIL_PRICE 371 0.14492... 0.9996...
 CRUDE_OIL_PRICE does not Granger Cause SHORT_INT__RATE 0.41740... 0.9564...
 LONG_INT__RATE does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE_RATE 371 1.63120... 0.0812...
 EXCHANGE_RATE does not Granger Cause LONG_INT__RATE 1.23270... 0.2586...
 SHARE_PRICE does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE_RATE 371 1.34150... 0.1930...
 EXCHANGE_RATE does not Granger Cause SHARE_PRICE 0.83356... 0.6157...
 M3 does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE_RATE 371 1.30599... 0.2128...
 EXCHANGE_RATE does not Granger Cause M3 1.87948... 0.0357...
 SHORT_INT__RATE does not Granger Cause EXCHANGE_RATE 371 1.67753... 0.0700...
 EXCHANGE_RATE does not Granger Cause SHORT_INT__RATE 1.78714... 0.0488...
 SHARE_PRICE does not Granger Cause LONG_INT__RATE 371 1.59580... 0.0908...
 LONG_INT__RATE does not Granger Cause SHARE_PRICE 2.18330... 0.0121...
 M3 does not Granger Cause LONG_INT__RATE 371 1.32677... 0.2010...
 LONG_INT__RATE does not Granger Cause M3 0.99261... 0.4554...
 SHORT_INT__RATE does not Granger Cause LONG_INT__RATE 371 5.72299... 5.0802...
 LONG_INT__RATE does not Granger Cause SHORT_INT__RATE 5.96085... 1.8252...
 M3 does not Granger Cause SHARE_PRICE 371 1.40955... 0.1592...
 SHARE_PRICE does not Granger Cause M3 1.97567... 0.0256...
 SHORT_INT__RATE does not Granger Cause SHARE_PRICE 371 1.45839... 0.1380...
 SHARE_PRICE does not Granger Cause SHORT_INT__RATE 1.67553... 0.0704...
 SHORT_INT__RATE does not Granger Cause M3 371 1.50894... 0.1186...
 M3 does not Granger Cause SHORT_INT__RATE 1.69633... 0.0658...
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  Granger Instantaneous 
  Exogenous -Crude oil prices- VAR(2) 
CPI Yes Yes 
Call money rate No No 
Exchange rate Yes Yes 
Share price No No 
M1 No No 
Policy rate No No 
Without Exogenous  -Crude oil prices- VAR(2) 
CPI No No 
Call money rate Yes Yes 
Exchange rate Yes Yes 
Share price No No 
M1 No No 
Policy rate No No 
 
